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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff Appellant, : 
v. 
RYAN WAYNE JOHNSON, Case No. 20040522-CA 
Defendant/Appellee. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(d) (2002). The State is appealing an interlocutory order 
granting the Defendant's motion to reduce the charges of aggravated robbery, first degree 
felonies in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (2003), to robbery, second degree 
felonies. A copy of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are in Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE. STANDARD OF REVIEW. PRESERVATION 
Issue. Whether the trial court correctly concluded that the evidence did not 
support a charge of aggravated robbery where the defendant had his hand in his pocket 
and demanded money but did not show the clerk a weapon or facsimile and did not make 
any verbal representations about a gun or weapon.1 
1
 A similar issue is before this Court in the defendant's appeal in State v. Ireland, 
Case No. 20040502-CA. In that case, the trial court denied the defendant's motion to 
reduce the charge from aggravated robbery to robbery. 
Standard of Review. '"The correct interpretation of a statute is a question of law 
and is reviewed for correctness.'" State v. Pixton. 2004 UT App 275, ^ 4, 98 P.3d 433 
(quoting State v. Larsen. 865 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1993)). 
Preservation. The issue was preserved below. Case No. 041900176 ("Rl") Rl. 
135-139, 140-146, 167-172; Case No. 041900182 ("R2") R2. 35-41,44-50; 58-63; R. 
174 
TEXT OF RELEVANT STATUTES 
The text of the following statutes is in Addendum B: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (2003) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601 (5)(b) (2003). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In an Information filed January 9, 2004, the State charged Appellee Ryan W. 
Johnson ("Appellee" or "Mr. Johnson") with four counts of aggravated robbery, first 
degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-302 (2003).2 Rl. 6-9. Another 
Information was filed on the same day charging Mr. Johnson with two additional counts 
of aggravated robbery, first degree felonies. R2. 6-8. Following bind-over (R. 173), Mr. 
Johnson filed a memorandum in support of a motion to reduce the six counts of 
aggravated robbery to second degree felonies. Rl. 135-139. After the State responded 
2The Information incorrectly cites aggravated robbery as a violation of Utah Code 
Ann. §76-6-301. Rl.6-9 
2 
(RL 140-146; R2. 35-41, 44-50), the trial court held a hearing on the motion on May 19, 
2004. R. 174. The trial court granted the motion and entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law on July 1, 2004. Rl. 167-172; R2. 58-63; 173:15-16. 
On June 11, 2004, the State filed a motion to stay the trial. Rl. 153; R2. 64-65. 
The trial court granted the State's motion to stay the jury trial. RL 155; R2. 69. On June 
22, 2004, the State filed a petition for interlocutory appeal with the Utah Supreme Court. 
RL 163. On June 28, 2004, the Supreme Court transferred the interlocutory appeal to 
this Court for disposition. RL 165 -166. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Two different Informations filed on January 9, 2004, charged Mr. Johnson with a 
total of six counts of aggravated robbery. Rl. 6-9; R2. 6-8 . The Informations allege that 
Mr. Johnson was the individual responsible for these crimes which occurred in December 
2003 and January 2004.3 RL 6-9; R2 6-8. The following facts are taken from the 
preliminary hearing held on February 10, 2004. R. 173. 
Case No. 041900176 
Count I: On December 21, 2003, Lisa Ovard, store manager, was working at the 
Sinclair gas station on 3310 South and 700 East in Salt Lake City. R. 173:9. "A 
gentleman came in with his head wrapped up in a white T-shirt and walked up to the 
3Mr. Johnson does not concede that he is actually the individual who committed 
these crimes. However, for purposes of this appeal only and to limit confusion, Mr. 
Johnson is referred to as the individual having committed these offenses. 
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counter." R. 173:9. Ovard thought the man was wearing the T-shirt around his head 
because it was cold outside. R. 173:10. The man had his right hand in his front coat 
pocket. R. 173:11. With his right hand in his pocket, the man placed his hand on the 
counter pointing it towards Ovard and placed a "Spitz Sunflower Seed bag on the 
counter" and asked Ovard to "put the money in the bag.'1 R. 173:10. Ovard asked the 
man if he wanted the change also. R. 173:11. The man replied that he wanted the 
quarters. R. 173:11. Ovard did not see anything in the man's hand. R. 173:13. Ovard 
thought the object in the coat pocket "was either a gun or a finger." R. 173:14. The man 
did not make any motions with his hand such as moving his arm up and down. R. 
173:14. Although Ovard did not know if he had a gun she testified that she was afraid 
for her life. R. 173:11. The man did not say that he had a gun, did not make any 
threatening gestures, and did not threaten Ovard that he was going to harm her in any 
way. R. 173:15-16. 
Count II: On December 22, 2003, Cynthia West, was working as a cashier at 
Phillips 66 on 315 East and 3900 South in Salt Lake City. R. 173:17. While West was 
changing the coffee filters, a man came in wearing a scarf over his face. R. 173:17. The 
man handed West a bag that West thought he wanted to have thrown away. R. 173:18. 
The man told West to "Fill it with money." R. 173:18, 21. West noticed that man had 
his right hand in his pocket of his sweatshirt which looked like he had a gun. R. 173:18. 
The man raised up his hand in his pocket about waist high with his index finger 
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extended. R. 173:23. The man did not point it at her. R. 173:24. West told police that 
she "didn't know whether it was his finger or a Tootsie Roll or a gun." R. 173:19, 23. 
Although, the man did not tell West he had a gun, did not make any threats, and did not 
make any aggressive motions towards her, West testified that she feared for her life. R. 
173:19, 23. West opened up the register and gave the man all the cash and asked him if 
he wanted all the coins as well. R. 173:18. The man said he wanted the quarters. R. 
173:19. West then said "Here's a couple of gold dollars for you, too." R. 173:19. West 
then asked if she could get the man anything else and he said "No, that's all I need." R. 
173:19. West then said "Alrighty then, you have a good day." R. 173:19. 
Count III: On December 23, 2003, Jennifer Forsgren worked as a cashier at 
Tesoro on 1200 West and 3900 South in Salt Lake City. R. 173:27. A man came into 
the store with a scarf wrapped around his head covering his face except for his eyes. R. 
173:28. Because it was cold outside, Forsgren did not think anything of it. R. 173:28. 
The man put a bag on the counter and said "Put the money in the bag." R. 173:29. The 
man had his right hand in his pocket and Forsgren assumed he had a gun. R. 173:29. 
However, the man did not have any of his fingers protruding in his pocket and did not 
raise it up in any manner. R. 173:32. The man just kind of stood there with his hand 
resting in his pocket. R. 173:32. Forsgren put the money in the bag and gave it to the 
man. R. 173:29. The man never said he had a gun or a weapon of any kind. R. 173:32. 
The man did not threaten Forsgren or move towards her in any threatening manner. R. 
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173:32. Even though it was cold outside, Forsgren assumed he had a gun because he had 
his hand resting inside his pocket. R. 173:33. 
Count IV: On December 24, 2003, Allan Cantonwine was working as a clerk at 
Phillips 66 on 315 East and 3900 South in Salt Lake City. R. 173:35. As he came in for 
work, his co-worker, Myeong-Ock Kim, asked him "How do you open the register?" R. 
173:35. There was a man with a thick jacket on and a white scarf over his face behind 
the counter with Kim. R. 173:35, 42. There was a baggy sitting on the counter and the 
man told Cantonwine to put the money in the bag. R. 173:37. Cantonwine put the 
money in the bag because he received training while working at 7-eleven to "Always do 
what you're told." R. 173:37. Cantonwine noticed that the man had his hand in his 
pocket with a finger extended. R. 173:37. Cantonwine testified that it could have been a 
candy bar, a finger, or a gun. R. 173:37. However, if it was a gun, he "didn't want him 
to shoot [Cantonwine]. If it was his finger, [Cantonwine] didn't care. [He] was just 
going to do what [he] was told." R. 173:38. The man never said he had a gun, never 
told Cantonwine that he would be harmed, and did not make any verbal threats at all. R. 
173:44. 
Case No. 041900182 
Count I: On January 6, 2004, Julie Valdez was employed at A Appliance & 
Refrigeration on 501 East and 2700 South in Salt Lake City. R. 173:60. A man came in 
and Valdez asked him if she could help him. R. 173:61. The man said "Give me your 
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money." R. 173:61. The man "protruded whatever he had in his pocket." R. 173:63. 
"Whether it was a gun or not, [Valdez did not] know." R. 173:63. Valdez testified that 
she "didn't think he [had a gun] because the bulge wasn't big enough." R. 173:66. 
Valdez told the man that she "didn't have any" money. R. 173:62. The man said "Yes, 
you do." R. 173:62. Valdez told the man that she didn't keep money there and asked the 
man if he saw a cash register around. R. 173:62. The man thought the microfiche 
equipment was a register. R. 173:62. Valdez told the man that it was a microfiche 
machine and again stated that she did not have any cash. R. 173:62. The man looked at 
Valdez and asked as if he had given up "You don't have even $20?" R. 173:62. Valdez 
said "No. I told you, I don't have any money." R. 173:62. The man then turned and left. 
R. 173:62. Valdez testified that the man never said he had a gun and never threaten her. 
R. 173:66. Valdez testified that the man "was very nice-spoken, soft-spoken, not 
aggressive, not anything that would make you think that he was going to cause you harm. 
He was a nice-spoken young man." R. 173:66. 
Count II: On January 6, 2004, Ester Cho was working at her store, Young's Food 
Mart, on 1249 South 900 East in Salt Lake City. R. 173:69. A man came into the store 
and walked up to the counter with his hand pointed in his pocket and asked Cho for 
money. R. 173:70. Cho "didn't know exactly what it was [in the man's pocket] but it 
scared" her. R. 173:71. Although Cho had more money in the register, she gave him 
$20 and told the man he was "committing a crime." R. 173:71, 72. The man responded 
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that he would pay her back and then left the store. R. 173:71. The man did not tell Cho 
he had a gun and did not say anything threatening towards her. R. 173:72-73. 
At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, the trial court bound Mr. Johnson 
over on all six felony counts of aggravated robbery. R. 30-31; 173:87; R2. 28-29. On 
May 3, 2004, Mr. Johnson filed a motion to reduce Counts I through IV in Case No. 
041900176 and Counts I and II in Case No. 041099182 to second degree felonies. Rl. 
135-139. On May 13, 2004 the State filed a memorandum in opposition to Mr. 
Johnson's motion. Rl. 140-146; R2. 35-41, 44-50. On May 19, 2004, the trial court 
held a hearing on Mr. Johnson's motion to reduce all six counts from aggravated 
robberies to simple robberies. R. 174. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court 
granted Mr. Johnson's motion finding that under the facts of this case, more is required 
to show aggravated robbery than just a hand in the pocket. R. 174:16. A copy of the 
hearing transcript is in Addendum C. 
The State filed a petition for interlocutory appeal with the Utah Supreme Court. 
R. 163. On June 28, 2004, the Supreme Court transferred the interlocutory appeal to this 
Court for disposition. R. 165. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court was correct in granting Mr. Johnson's motion to reduce the charges 
of aggravated robbery to simple robbery. All robberies involve a threat and fear by the 
victim. In order to elevate a robbery to an aggravated robbery, the conduct of the 
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defendant, not the subjective reaction of the victim, controls. Moreover, in order to 
maintain the distinction between an aggravated and simple robbery, the defendant must 
do more than create a threat or cause fear. Instead, the defendant must make a tangible 
representation that he has an item and, further, make a tangible representation that the 
item in his control is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. A hand in a 
pocket even when pointed in the direction of a complainant, in absence of a verbal 
representation, fails to rise to this level. 
However, even if a hand in a pocket without more constitutes a "representation" 
under the statute, more is required before it is considered a dangerous weapon. For a 
representation to fall within the meaning of a dangerous weapon, the complainants must 
possess a reasonable belief that the item is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury. 
The complainants in this case did not possess the requisite reasonable belief necessary 
under the statute. Therefore, the trial court correctly granted defendant's motion to 
reduce the charges to second degree felonies. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT UNDER 
THE FACTS OF THIS CASE THE AGGRAVATED ROBBERY CHARGES 
SHOULD BE REDUCED TO SIMPLE ROBBERY WHERE THE APPELLEE 
DID NOT DISPLAY A GUN AND DID NOT MAKE A VERBAL 
REPRESENTATION REGARDING THE USE OF A GUN. 
The trial court correctly concluded "under the specific facts of this case . . . there 
was insufficient evidence to establish that [Mr. Johnson] made a "representation" of a 
9 
dangerous weapon sufficient to comply with the requirements" under Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-302. See R. 167-172. The trial court based its conclusion on the fact that "there 
were no verbal statements accompanied by any physical action similar to the 
"representation" found in State v. Canderlario. 909 P.2d 277 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)." R. 
171-72. 
In State v. Suniville, 741 P.2d 961 (Utah 1987), the supreme court held that the 
defendant did not commit an aggravated robbery where he had his hand in his pocket 
held up over the counter as if he had a gun, with something pointing at the victim, and 
made threats that he would "blast" people if they did not cooperate. IJL at 962. The 
version of section 76-6-302 then in effect defined aggravated robbery as a robbery where 
the perpetrator used "a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm." Id. The Suniville court 
concluded that the defendant's actions did not amount to an aggravated robbery because 
he did not use a weapon or a replica of a weapon. Id. at 964-65. In reaching that 
conclusion, the Court reasoned that any other holding would "erode the statutory 
distinction between robbery and aggravated robbery." IcL_ at 965. The court stated in 
part, "Defendant's menacing gesture accompanied by verbal threats is not sufficient 
evidence alone to establish the use of a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm. To hold 
otherwise would pervert the language of section 76-6-302 and erode the statutory 
distinction between robbery and aggravated robbery." Id. 
Following the decision in Suniville, the legislature amended the aggravated 
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robbery and dangerous weapon statutes. The current version requires the use or 
threatened use of a dangerous weapon and defines a dangerous weapon in part as a 
facsimile or representation of a dangerous weapon. Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-302 (2003), 
76-1-601 (2003). Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (2003), which outlines the elements for 
aggravated robbery, states, "(1) [a] person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of 
committing robbery, he: (a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in 
Section 76-1-601." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-60l(5)(b) (2003) defines a dangerous 
weapon as "a facsimile or representation of the item, and (i) the actor's use or apparent 
intended use of the item leads the victim to reasonably believe the item is likely to cause 
death or serious bodily injury; or (ii) the actor represents to the victim verbally or in any 
other manner that he is in control of such an item." IdL_ (emphasis added). 
Under the current version of the statute, this Court has interpreted the term 
representation in the dangerous weapon statute to include a verbal representation that one 
has a firearm. See State v. Candelario. 909 P.2d 277, 279 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); State v. 
Adams. 830 P.2d 310 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Nevertheless, the concerns outlined in 
Suniville that the distinction between aggravated and simple robbery must be maintained 
and that defendant must do or say something tangible beyond the force and fear involved 
in any robbery continue to control. This Court's holdings that a verbal representation by 
the robber that he has a gun is sufficiently tangible to support an aggravated robbery 
maintains a distinction between the two crimes that is lost when a hand in the pocket 
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without verbal representations is used to elevate the crime. 
For example, the defendant in Candelario claimed to have a gun and threatened to 
kill the clerk but did not physically portray possession of a firearm. IdL at 277. Under 
these circumstances, the determination of whether a gun was involved was not left to the 
subjective reaction of the victim because the defendant verbally represented that he had a 
gun. This Court concluded that the term "representation" refers not only to a physical 
likeness, but also to Ma statement conveying an impression for the purpose of influencing 
action." Id at 278. 
The robber in Adams verbally threatened to use a gun while also f,put[ing] his 
hand on his bulging pocket, leading [the victim] to believe [the robber] had a gun and 
reasonably fear for her safety." Adams. 830 P.2d at 313. This Court upheld the 
aggravated robbery conviction because "[threatening to use a dangerous weapon while 
committing a robbery . . . is sufficient to fit within the aggravated robbery . . . statute[]." 
IcL (citing State v. Hartmann. 783 P.2d 544 (Utah 1989). In reaching the decision in 
Adams, this Court relied on Hartmann, which upheld a conviction for aggravated sexual 
assault where the defendant raped a woman while verbally telling her that he had a gun. 
Id. This Court concluded in Hartmann that the use or display of a dangerous weapon is 
not required when the defendant makes a verbal threat to use a dangerous weapon. IcL_ at 
547. 
Recently, in State v. Revos. 2004 UT App 151,91 P.3d 861, this Court again held 
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that a defendant's statements that he had a gun were a representation that elevated a 
robbery to an aggravated robbery even if the defendant did not have a gun. In that case, 
the defendant yelled, "[g]et the gun and shoot" and "shoot to kill." IcL at Tf4. This Court 
reasoned that defendant's statement "clearly 'conveyed an impression5 that a gun would 
be used 'for the purpose of influencing actionf]'" and the aggravated robbery charge was 
therefore appropriate. Id. 
Pursuant to Adams, Candelario, Hartmann, and Reyos, a charge of aggravated 
robbery would have been appropriate if Appellant had made verbal representations 
regarding a gun. Mr. Johnson is not accused of making any such verbal representations. 
Instead, Mr. Johnson, at most, is accused of having his finger extended in his pocket 
during a couple of the encounters where he asked for money to be put in a bag. To be 
convicted of aggravated robbery, Mr. Johnson would have had to "use or threaten to use 
a dangerous weapon." Utah Code Ann. §76-6-302. The dangerous weapon statute 
requires a representation, that is, some sort of likeness, coupled with either a verbal 
representation that the item is a dangerous weapon or some representation "in any other 
manner" that the robber is in control of an item that is likely to cause death or serious 
bodily injury. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601 (5)(b). 
The use of the word "and" in section 76-l-601(5)(b) demonstrates that something 
more than just a representation of an item is required; instead, the defendant must make a 
representation of an item and further represent that the item is likely to cause death or 
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serious bodily injury. Even if a finger in the pocket were considered a "representation of 
an item,'1 it fails to meet the requirements of subsection (ii) since a hand in the pocket 
does not amount to a representation that the item is capable of causing death or serious 
bodily injury. In fact, in this case, the complainants speculated that there was a weapon 
in the pocket but had no basis for determining whether the item in the pocket was 
anything more than "a Tootsie Roll, a finger, or a gun," let alone that the item was 
capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. R. 173:14, 19, 23, 37. Some of the 
complainants' testimony that they were afraid because they thought Mr. Johnson might 
have a gun because his hand was in his pocket was their subjective response to the fear 
they felt during the robbery and was based on speculation rather than a representation by 
Mr. Johnson that he had a weapon capable of causing serious bodily injury. Allowing a 
witness's subjective reaction under circumstances that necessarily involve threats and 
fear fails to make a workable distinction between simple and aggravated robbery. 
The court in Williams v. Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 710, 712 (Ky. 1986), 
concluded that the defendant did not commit an aggravated robbery where he "threatened 
the night clerk by reaching towards his back pocket and cautioning, 'Do you want your 
life?5" IcL at 711. Similar to the present case, the clerk in that case testified "that when 
he was threatened, he believed 'maybe he (Appellant) had a weapon or something.5" IcL 
In rejecting the aggravated robbery charge, the court recognized that threat of harm exists 
in simple robbery as well as aggravated robbery, and the two charges must be 
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distinguished by something other than the threat of physical harm. IcL_ Moreover, the 
complainant's response to a threat cannot define the nature of the crime and a 
complainant's speculation that there might have been a weapon does not support an 
aggravated robbery charge. This is so because the degree of the crime would be left to 
the subjective response of the victim, not the actions of the perpetrator. IcL at 712. 
To do otherwise places defendant virtually without defense at the caprice 
of a victim's subjective evaluation without regard to the actual course of 
events and could least to convictions for crimes neither intended nor 
enacted. Our heritage of justice applies the law to the facts. Herein the fact 
is that although force was threatened, the presence of a weapon or 
instrument was illusory at best. Without an instrument ever being seen, an 
intimidating threat, albeit coupled with a menacing gesture cannot suffice 
to meet the standard necessary for a first degree robbery conviction. 
IcL at 712. While a verbal threat to use a gun would suffice for an aggravated robbery 
charge, in Williams where the defendant threatened only to hurt the clerk then reached 
toward his back pocket, the facts did not rise to an aggravated robbery. Indeed, labeling 
a crime as an armed robbery under these circumstances would blur the distinction 
between simple and aggravated robbery. The Williams court recognized this, stating: 
This, however, does not distinguish it from second degree robbery in which 
the threat of physical force is the gravamen. A response of perceiving 
danger is quite real under threat; however, such cannot serve to convert 
something merely speculated upon (a weapon or instrument) into 
established existence . . . . Without an instrument ever being seen, an 
intimidating threat albeit coupled with a menacing gesture cannot suffice to 
meet the standard necessary for a first-degree robbery conviction 
Without something tangible backing up the threat, words do not reach 
beyond the status of threats and as such are insufficient to sustain 
submission under first-degree robbery. 
15 
14 at 712-13. 
Focusing on the actions of the defendant rather than the subjective response of the 
complainant is consistent not only with Suniville but also with the language of 
subsection (ii) which requires the robber to represent that he is in control of an item that 
the victim reasonably believes is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. This 
reasonable belief language necessarily involves an objective review of the defendant's 
conduct rather than a focus on the victim's subjective reaction. 
In Michigan, the appellate courts have "long recognized that the victim's 
subjective belief alone is insufficient to support a conviction of armed robbery." State v. 
Taylor, 628 N.W.2d 55 (Mich. 2001) (emphasis in original). To prove armed robbery 
under the Michigan state statute, the state must prove that a robber "possess[ed] a 
dangerous weapon, or an article used or fashioned in a manner to lead any person present 
to reasonably believe the article [was] a dangerous weapon." Mich. Comp. Laws 
§750.529 (2004)4 (emphasis added). "In a 'feigned weapon' case, the prosecutor meets 
the 'armed' requirement of the statute by proving that during the commission of a 
robbery the defendant simulated a weapon so as to induce the victim to reasonably 
believe he was armed." Taylor, 628 N.W.2d at 58. The Taylor court explained that 
4The statute under which Taylor was decided required the state to prove essentially 
the same elements in order to sustain a conviction of armed robbery, that is, a robber was 
"armed with a dangerous weapon, or any article used or fashioned in a manner to lead the 
person so assaulted to reasonably believe it to be a dangerous weapon." 
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while a "portion of the armed robbery statute focuses on the belief of the victim that the 
defendant was armed, that belief must be reasonable and [the Michigan] courts have long 
recognized that the victim's subjective belief alone is insufficient to support a conviction 
of armed robbery." Id at 59 (emphasis in original). Instead, 
There must be some objective evidence of the existence of a weapon or 
article before a jury will be permitted to assess the merits of an armed 
robbery charge. For example, an object pointing out from under a coat, 
together with statements threatening a victim with being shot, clearly 
satisfies the statutory definition of armed robbery. In such a case, there is 
evidence of actual possession of a weapon or article and the testimony 
regarding the statements that, if believed, make clear an intent to convince 
the victim of the existence of such a weapon or article. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
In Taylor, the court determined that the evidence presented at trial "went well 
beyond a mere subjective belief that defendant was armed during the robbery." IdL at 61. 
The court found the quantum of objective evidence led the complainant to reasonably 
believe that the defendant had a gun. 
Complainant testified that, during the robbery, defendant placed his hand 
inside his jacket and into the front of his pants. Objectively, defendant 
could have carried a weapon under his jacket and in his waistband. As in 
[People v. Jolly, 502 N.W.2d 177 (Mich. 1993)], complainant also testified 
to the presence of a bulge in defendant's jacket, indicating that defendant 
actually possessed a weapon or fashioned his hand or some other article to 
feign a weapon. Complainant specifically stated, "I knew there was a piece 
in there the way he grabbed it and the way it was [sic] his hand and the 
jacket were bulged." Indeed, defendant's hand grabbed for and remained 
on the bulge inside his jacket as he took the money from the register and 
left the station. 
This visual evidence was bolstered by complainant's testimony that 
defendant made a verbal threat, "This is a stick up," while grabbing for the 
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object in his jacket. While defendant did not specifically threaten to shoot 
complainant, the phrase "this is a stick upM is universally understood to 
indicate the presence of a weapon. 
Id 
The court determined that "this threat, along with defendant's demand that complainant 
open the cash register, could objectively lead complainant to believe that defendant 
possessed a gun or other dangerous weapon.'1 IcL_ 
In this case, the trial court correctly concluded that more than the complainants 
subjective belief that Mr. Johnson might have a gun in his pocket was required under the 
statute. Otherwise, the distinction between aggravated robbery and simple robbery 
would be eroded leaving defendants "at the caprice of a victim's subjective evaluation" 
in determining whether an aggravated robbery was committed. Williams, 721 S.W. 2d at 
712. All robberies necessarily involve fear by the victim and threats causing this fear 
which propels the victim to respond to the robber's request. But a robbery where the 
robber actually carries a gun, facsimile or other dangerous weapon or represents that he 
has a gun raises a far greater threat than a robbery such as this one where the robber 
simply had his hand in his pocket. 
POINT II. EVEN IF THIS COURT DETERMINES A HAND IN A 
POCKET WITHOUT MORE CONSTITUTES A "REPRESENTATION" 
UNDER THE STATUTE. THE COMPLAINANTS' BELIEF WAS NOT 
REASONABLE. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601 requires the following elements to be met 
before an item is considered a dangerous weapon. An actor must produce a "a facsimile 
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or representation" of a dangerous weapon and the "actor's use or apparent intended use 
of the item leads the victim to reasonably believe the item is likely to cause death or 
serious bodily injury; or the actor represents to the victim verbally or in any other manner 
that he is in control" of an item that is likely to cause death or serious bodily must be 
made." IcL Even if this Court were to determine that a hand in the pocket alone is a 
"representation" within the meaning of the statute, it must also be shown that the 
complainants reasonably believed that the item possessed was likely to cause death or 
serious bodily injury. In this case, the evidence shows that the complainants either did 
not reasonably believe that Mr. Johnson had a gun or did not reasonably believe that the 
item "was likely to cause death or serious bodily injury." See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-
601. 
For example, in support of Count III, in Case No. 041900176, the State called 
Jennifer Forsgren to testify regarding the events that occurred at a Tesoro gas station on 
December 23, 2003. R. 173:27. Forsgren testified that it was cold outside so she did not 
think anything of the man walking in with a scarf wrapped around his face and head. R. 
173:28. The man put a bag on the counter and asked Forsgren to "Put the money in the 
bag." R. 173:29. Despite it being cold outside, Forsgren assumed because Mr. Johnson 
had his hand resting in his coat pocket, he had a gun. R. 173:29. Forsgren testified that 
she did not see any fingers protruding from Mr. Johnson's coat, instead, Mr. Johnson's 
hand was just kind of resting in his pocket down at his side. R. 173:29. Mr. Johnson did 
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not tell Forsgren he had a gun, did not verbally threaten her, and did not move toward her 
in a threatening manner. 
A hand resting in one's pocket on a cold winter's day does not qualify as a 
"representation" of a dangerous weapon under the statute. Moreover, a hand simply 
resting in ones pocket even when asking for money does not give rise to a reasonable 
belief that the actor is in possession of an item that will cause death or serious bodily 
injury. 
Similarly, Julie Valdez's testimony, in support of4Count I in Case No. 041900182, 
did not support a reasonable belief that Mr. Johnson made a representation that he was in 
possession of an item that would cause death or serious bodily injury. R. 173:59-66. 
Valdez testified that she was working on January 6, 2004 at A Appliance & Refrigeration 
Company when a man came in and said "Give me your money." R. 173:60-61. Valdez 
testified that when asking for the money, Mr. Johnson "protruded whatever he had in his 
pocket. . . whether it was a gun or not, I don't know." R. 173:63. Valdez testified that 
she "didn't think it was one thing or another" but "kind of didn't think he did [have a 
gun] because the bulge wasn't big enough." R. 173:63,66. Valdez testified that after 
they had discussed that she didn't have any money, Mr. Johnson stated like he had given 
up "Oh, well, have you go at least $20?" R. 173:66. Valdez testified that Mr. Johnson 
never said he had gun and never threatened her. R. 173:66. In fact, Valdez described 
Mr. Johnson as a "very nice-spoken, soft-spoken, not aggressive, not anything that would 
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make you think that he was going to cause you harm. He was a nice-spoken young man." 
R. 173:66. 
Valdez's testimony does not support a finding that she had a reasonable belief that 
Mr. Johnson was in possession of an item that would cause death or serious bodily 
injury. Valdez testified that she did not believe that Mr. Johnson had a gun because "the 
bulge wasn't big enough." R. 173:66. In fact, Valdez's testified that Mr. Johnson did 
not do "anything that would make you think that he was going to cause you harm." R. 
173:66. 
Allan Cantonwine's testimony also fails to support a reasonable belief that Mr. 
Johnson was in possession of an item that would cause death or serious bodily injury as 
required under the statute. The State called Cantonwine to testify, in support of Count 
IV, Case No. 041900176, regarding what occurred on December 24, 2003 at a Phillips 
gas station. R. 173:35. Cantonwine testified that Mr. Johnson told him to "put the 
money in the bag." R. 173:37. Cantonwine testified that he put the money in the bag 
because he has been taught in prior employment training to "Always do what you're 
told." R. 173:37. Cantonwine testified that Mr. Johnson also had his hand in his pocket 
with his finger extended. R. 173:37. Cantonwine testified on direct that "It could have 
been a candy bar, a finger, a gun. I didn't know, so I just did what he said. If it was a 
gun, I didn't want him to shoot me. If it was his finger, I didn't care. I was just going to 
do what I was told." R. 173:37-38. Mr. Johnson never said he had a gun and never 
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made any threats at all. R. 173:44. 
Cantonwine's testimony does not support that he had a reasonable belief that Mr. 
Johnson possessed an item that would cause death or serious bodily injury. Cantonwine 
testified that he put the money in the bag because that was what he has been trained to 
do, to "Always do what you're told." R. 173:37. Cantonwine testified that Mr. Johnson 
could have been carrying a candy bar or simply have his finger in his pocket. This 
testimony fails to support the proof necessary for an aggravated robbery under the statue. 
Likewise, the testimony of the three other witnesses fails to support a reasonable 
belief that during these robberies, Mr. Johnson was in possession of an item likely to 
cause death or serious bodily injury. In support of Count I, the State called Lisa Ovard to 
testify regarding the events that occurred at a Sinclair gas station on December 21, 2003. 
R. 173:8. Ovard testified that "a gentleman came in with his head wrapped up in a white 
T-shirt and walked up to the counter." R. 173:9. Ovard just thought the man had his 
head wrapped up because it was cold outside. R. 173:10. Mr. Johnson then put a Spitz 
Sunflower Seed bag on the counter and told Ovard to "put the money in the bag." R. 
173:10. As he did this, Mr. Johnson also placed his hand which was in his coat pocket 
on the counter pointed toward Ovard. R. 173:11. Mr. Johnson did not make any 
motions with his hand, did not make any threatening gestures, and did not threaten Ovard 
in any way verbally. R. 173:14-14. Ovard thought "it was either a gun or a finger" in his 
pocket." R. 173:14. 
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The State called Cynthia West to testify in support of Count II regarding the 
events that occurred at a Phillips gas station on December 22, 2003. R. 173:17. West 
testified that Mr. Johnson handed her a bag and asked her to "fill it." R. 173:18. West 
noticed Mr. Johnson had his hand in his sweatshirt pocket with his finger extended. R. 
173:18. West told police officers that she "didn't know if it was his finger or a Tootsie 
Roll or a gun." R. 173:19. Mr. Johnson did not tell West he had a gun, did not make any 
aggressive motions towards West, and did not threaten her. R. 173:23. 
Finally, the State called Esther Cho, in support of Count II, Case No. 041900182, 
to testify regarding what occurred on January 6, 2004 at her food mart. R. 173:69. Cho 
testified that a man whom she could not identify came into her store. R. 173:70-71. The 
man "put his hand in his pocket and pointed, not necessarily toward me, but he did ask 
me for the money at the same time while he was also pointing." R. 173:70. Cho did not 
know what exactly was in his pocket. R. 173:71. Cho gave the man $20, even though 
she had more in the register and told him "You're committing a crime." R. 173:71. The 
man said he would pay her back and then left the store. R. 173:71. The man did not say 
he had a gun and did not threaten her in any way. R. 173:72-73. 
The trial court correctly concluded that none of these complainants' testimony was 
sufficient to support an aggravated robbery charge. Rl: 167-172. None of the 
complainants could tell whether Mr. Johnson had a gun or simply a piece of candy or a 
finger in his pocket. Even if a hand in the pocket could be a "representation" under that 
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statute, under the facts of this case, the complainants' subjective speculation as to 
whether Mr. Johnson possessed a dangerous weapon in his pocket is insufficient to prove 
aggravated robbery . Therefore, even if this Court finds that Mr. Johnson's hand in his 
pocket falls within the meaning of a representation under the statute, the complainants' 
testimony fails to support that they had a reasonable belief that he possessed an item 
capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. In the absence of a verbal threat, the 
benign conduct of holding a hand in a pocket fails to elevate the conduct to an 
aggravated robbery. Therefore, under the facts of this case, the trial court correctly 
reduced the aggravated robbery charges to simple robbery. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellee/Defendant Ryan Wayne Johnson respectfully requests that this Court 
affirm the trial court's order granting his motion to reduce the charges to second degree 
felonies. 
SUBMITTED this a\** day of December, 2004. 
DEBRA M.NELSON 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee 
PATRICK L. ANDERSON 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, : 
RYAN WAYNE JOHNSON, : Case Nos. 041900176 & 041900182 
Defendant. : JUDGE LESLIE A. LEWIS 
Based upon the Motion of the Defendant, all Memorandum filed by both parties herein, 
a full review of the transcript of the Preliminary Hearing held on February 10, 2004 
(hereinafter referred to as 'Transcript' or 'Tr'), argument on the Motion and good cause 
appearing the Court herein makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That the Court has reviewed all Motions and Memorandum filed in this case as well as 
the full transcript of the Preliminary Hearing conducted on February 10, 2004. 
2. That in Counts I through IV in Case no. 041900176 the Defendant entered 
Convenience/Gas Stations with a scarf or shirt wrapped around his head with only his 
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eyes visible. 
That in Counts I and II in Case no. 041900182 the Defendant entered a business which 
was a non-retail establishment and Young's Market with a hooded sweatshirt pulled up 
over his head and was wearing either a hat or a cap. 
That Lisa Ovard (Count I, Case no. 041900176) testified that the Defendant came into 
the store with his right hand inside of his coat or sweatshirt and put his right hand on 
the counter and did not move the hand once it was on the counter. That either a gun or 
a finger was pointing inside of Defendant's sweater or sweatshirt that was resting on the 
counter. Tr at 10 and 14. 
That the Defendant told Lisa Ovard to "put the money in the bag". Tj\ at 11 and 14. 
That at no time did the Defendant tell Lisa Ovard that he had a gun or did he threaten 
with a gun or give her a note which made any reference to a gun. 
That Cynthia West (Count II, Case no. 041900176) testified that the Defendant came in 
to her store with his hand in his right pocket and gave her a bag and asked her to "fill 
it". T|\at21. 
That Cynthia West testified the Defendant did point something in his pocket and said 
that "it could have been a Tootsie Roll, a finger, or a gun". TY at 23. That at no 
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time did Defendant tell Cynthia West that he had a gun, give her a note to the effect 
that he had a gun or make any statements which she inferred to imply that he had a gun. 
8. That upon entering the store where Jennifer Forsgren worked ( Count III, Case no. 
041900176), the Defendant had his right hand in his pocket, put a bag on the counter 
and said "Put the money in the bag". Ti\at29. That Jennifer Forsgren did not see 
any fingers or anything protruding from the Defendant's pocket and indicated that the 
Defendant merely stood with his hand resting in his pocket down by his side. Ti\ at 
32. That Jennifer Forsgren indicated that the Defendant at no time said that he had a 
gun, did not give her a note that he had a gun and did not verbally threaten her in any 
way. Trat32. 
9. That Jennifer Forsgren said that the Defendant had one hand out and one hand in his 
pocket and therefore, she "...just assumed he had something in there, something that 
led me to believe that he had something." Tr. At 33. 
10. That Allan Cantonwine (Count IV, Case no. 041900176) testified that when he came 
into the store the Defendant was behind the counter with another employee. Tr, At 36. 
11. That Allan Cantonwine indicated that there was a baggie sitting on the counter and that 
the Defendant told him to put the money in the bag. Tr. at 37. 
Page 3 of 6 
/ 
12. That Allan Cantonwine testified that the Defendant had his right hand in his sweatshirt 
pocket with a finger extended and stated that "It could have been a candy bar, a finger 
a gun." TL. at 37. 
13. That Allan Cantonwine testified that at no time did the Defendant say that he had a gun, 
verbally threaten either individual in the store or give a note indicating that he had a 
gun. Trat44. 
14. That Julie Valdez (Count I, Case no. 041900182) testified that the Defendant came into 
her business, which is a non-retail business, and stated "Give me your money." Tr at 
61. 
15. That Julie Valdez testified that the Defendant had his right hand in his pocket and a 
finger was protruding out a few inches from his body. Tr. at 63. 
16. That the Defendant never said that he had a gun and did not threaten with a gun and, 
"...[h]e was very nice-spoken, soft-spoken, not aggressive, not anything that would 
make you think that he was going to cause you harm." Ti\ at 66. 
17. That in fact, Julie Valdez stated that she kind of didn't think the Defendant had a gun 
because the bulge wasn't big enough. Tr at 66. 
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18. That Esther Cho (Count II, Case no. 041900182) testified the Defendant had his right 
hand in his pocket and pointed, not necessarily towards her, at the time he asked for 
money. Tn at 70. 
19. That at no time did Defendant tell Esther Cho that he had a gun, give her a note 
indicating that he had a gun or make threats in any other way. Tr\ at 72. 
20. That the Court specifically found that there were no verbal representations of the 
Defendant's intent to use violence or any verbal representations that he had a gun or 
weapon of any kind. 
21. That the Court specifically found that the testimony of all of the witnesses at the 
Preliminary Hearing was essentially there was a bulge in the Defendant's right pocket 
with his hand in his pocket and some of the witnesses said that something was 
protruding, and could have been a Tootsie roll, a piece of candy, a finger, or a gun. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That under the specific facts of this case that there was insufficient evidence to establish 
that the Defendant had made a "representation" of a dangerous weapon sufficient to 
comply with the requirements set forth under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302. And, that 
given that there were no verbal statements accompanied by any physical action similar 
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to the "representation" found in State v. Canderlario. 909 P.2nd 277 (Utah App. 1995) 
the Court finds that under the specific facts of this case that they do not sufficiently 
meet the requirements of a representation required by case law in the State of Utah and 
that this conclusion is equitable and fair under the law. 
2. That Defendant's motion to reduce Counts I through IV in Case no. 01900176 to 
Second Degree Felonies is hereby granted. 
3. The Defendant's motion to reduce Counts I and II in Case no. 041900782 to Second 
Degree Felonies is hereby granted. 
DATED this 0_<tey of Mi?, 2004. / ' ' 
JUDGE LESLIE A. LEWIS 
Third District Court 
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76-6-302. Aggravated robbery. 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing 
robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 
76-1-601; 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or 
(c) takes or attempts to take an operable motor vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the 
course of committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the 
commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a 
robbery. 
76-1-601. Definitions. 
Unless otherwise provided, the following terms apply to this title: 
(1) "Act" means a voluntary bodily movement and includes speech. 
(2) "Actor" means a person whose criminal responsibility is in issue in 
a criminal action. 
(3) "Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of 
physical condition. 
(4) "Conduct" means an act or omission. 
(5) "Dangerous weapon" means: 
(a) any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; or 
(b) a facsimile or representation of the item; and: 
(i) the actor's use or apparent intended use of the item leads 
the victim to reasonably believe the item is likely to cause death 
or serious bodily injury; or 
(ii) the actor represents to the victim verbally or in any other 
manner that he is in control of such an item. 
(6) "Offense" means a violation of any penal statute of this state. 
(7) "Omission" means a failure to act when there is a legal duty to act 
and the actor is capable of acting. 
(8) "Person" means an individual, public or private corporation, govern-
ment, partnership, or unincorporated association. 
(9) "Possess" means to have physical possession of or to exercise 
dominion or control over tangible property. 
(10) "Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes 
serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the 
function of any bodily member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of 
death. 
(11) "Substantial bodily injury" means bodily injury, not amounting to 
serious bodily injury, that creates or causes protracted physical pain, 
temporary disfigurement, or temporary loss or impainnent of the function 
of any bodily member or organ. 
(12) "Writing" or "written" includes any handwriting, typewriting, 
printing, electronic storage or transmission, or any other method of 
recording information or fixing information in a form capable of being 
preserved. 
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May 1 9 , 2 0 0 4 
2 : 0 0 p . m . 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
* * * * * 
THE COURT: Okay, we are here in the matter — in two 
matters involving the same defendant, Ryan Wayne Johnson, case 
number 041900176, in which there are four counts of first 
degree robbery, and case number 041900182, in which we've got 
two counts of ag robbery. I should note on the case I 
referenced last, the one ending with the numbers 182, it was 
originally filed as a three-count case, but only two counts 
were bound over; is that correct? 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Thatfs correct, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. So in that case we had ag 
robbery and ag robbery. And there is a motion with reference 
to Count II only, as I understand it; is that correct? 
MR. ANDERSON: That' s correct, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Then turning to the companion case ending 
with the numbers 176, I'll indicate for the record that there 
are four counts, and they're all ag robberies and they all 
involve gas stations. 
I have taken the opportunity to read the Motion to 
Quash Bind Over on Count II, the Memorandum in Support of 
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Motion to Reduce Counts I through IV in the case ending with 
the number 176 and Counts I and II in the case ending with the 
number 00182. I have nothing from the State. I also have read 
the transcript from the preliminary hearing and the State may 
well have been relying on that. 
In any event, I feel like I have a general 
understanding of the testimony of the witnesses, at least what 
they said at the preliminary hearing, and a general feel for 
the case. My understanding in that case is there would be four 
ag robbery cases. The theory — I think we can all agree that 
no gun was ever seen. And there was no representation that the 
person had a gun, except by pointing a finger or an object from 
the pocket area, but no gun was verbally referenced in any of 
the cases. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: That's correct, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Additionally, we have a clear I.D. on the 
fourth of the ag robberies, but no I.D. on the other three. So 
the State is basically I suppose intending to rely upon the 
fourth I.D. and the similarity of the crimes to provide enough 
for — to meet their burden with reference to all four counts; 
isnf t that correct? 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Plus the confession. 
THE COURT: Plus the confessery remarks; sorry, I 
omitted that. That takes care of the case in terms of my 
understanding ending with the numbers 176. 
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In the companion case, it's not really — the facts 
are not really that similar to the case I just alluded to. It 
doesn't involve a gas station, for example. A scarf around the 
face and head; no white head scarf. There was a show up I.D. 
for one of the victims as I understand where identification was 
made, and no I.D. in the other instance. I believe that was 
the case where an Asian woman said all Americans look the same 
to her. 
MR. ANDERSON: Yes. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: And my response was, Tuchae. 
THE COURT: I did note that. And I note that the 
remark — not your remark but her remark — was interesting. 
Anyway, that's my understanding of the facts. And you are 
welcome to clarify or correct me if I'm wrong, but that's what 
I understand. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: I'm a bit upset, your Honor, on 
the — 
THE COURT: What did I say? 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Oh, no, no, you said that you didn't 
get my response, it was sent on the 12 of May — 
THE COURT: Well, what I said, Mr. Updegrove, and I 
want to correct this so that you are not upset, I didn't say I 
didn't get it, I said it isn't in the file. And while that 
appears to be a distinction without a difference, it's a huge 
distinction because I have every confidence that you sent it, 
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it just did not make its way upstairs. So I would very much 
like to look at it. But I do not hold it against you that it 
didnf t get to the file, and that' s more often the case than not 
with our filing system. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: If I might, your Honor — 
THE COURT: Ifm happy, of course, to hear anything 
you have to say. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: If I might — 
THE COURT: Surely. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: — give you — if you want a chance 
to take a quick read through. 
THE COURT: Why don't I do that. I've been handed 
the State's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to 
Quash Bind Over of Count II in the case ending with the numbers 
0182. And I've been handed a Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendantf s Motion to Reduce Counts in both cases. Let me take 
a minute and read them. 
If11 tell you at the outset, gentlemen, not to 
indicate that I've made up my mind prematurely, but of course 
the heart of this is the legal authority and also the 
transcript from the preliminary hearing. And this will perhaps 
aid you in the points that you want to get to or what If m more 
interested in. I'm more concerned about the reduction of 
counts or dismissal than quashing one of the counts, if that 
makes sense. 
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MR. UPDEGROVE: That!s what concerns you is the 
dismissal? 
THE COURT: My concern is that the case law that 
Mr. Anderson has alluded to seems to make it quite clear that 
while you don't need to see a gun, certainly you need to have 
something more than just a finger pointing. In other words, 
verbal threat seems to be required if you don't actually see — 
or at least a reference to the gun if you donf t actually see 
the object. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: And thatfs the Sunnyville case. Your 
Honor, if you — did you read where the Sunnyville case was pre 
1989. 
THE COURT: Yes, I did. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: It was '87. 
THE COURT: And I recognize that the law was changed 
and broadened, but still it appears clear to me that more is 
required than a gesture. I think if the gun is not displayed, 
you still need to have some words that accompany the gesture. 
Why don't we begin our dialogue with that, Mr. Updegrove, 
because I may well be mistaken. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Certainly. Of course, not to beat a 
dead horse, the language that your Honor is referring to is 
uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in the 
statute. Uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon. And of 
course the threat — or rather — or rather when we talk about 
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a d. .gerous weapon, a dangerous weapon is defined as an item 
capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; obviously a 
gun, knife, club, something of that nature. A facsimile or 
representation of the item. And a facsimile or representation, 
we certainly say that sticking your finger out from your 
sweatshirt or your jacket, pointing it at someone is 
representation of a weapon. And, and here is where I think we 
make it, the actor's use or apparent intended use of the item 
leads the victim to reasonably believe the item is likely to 
cause death or serious bodily injury. So that's the State of 
the law as of '89. The facsimile representation, certainly the 
finger suffices when it can't be seen. 
THE COURT: Well, I'm not sure of that. That may be 
an area where I have a question. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: And — 
THE COURT: Facsimile would be a toy gun or an 
inoperable weapon or something that looks like a gun that's 
visually displayed. I'm not sure that your hand in your pocket 
or even a finger protruding is sufficient. The witnesses said 
it could have been a gun, it could have been, quote, a Tootsy 
Roll, it could have been a candy bar, it could have been a 
finger• 
MR. UPDEGROVE: True. 
THE COURT: And that none of them were certain as to 
what it was. 
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MR. UPDEGROVE: And that's where the second part 
comes in. I agree it was not a facsimile of a gun, it was a 
representation of a dangerous weapon. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: It's a facsimile or representation. 
And when we go down, and I made some more notes from what we 
had put down in the response, and when you take a look at the 
first one, when you look now at representation and the fear 
that the representation caused, fear of death or serious bodily 
injury, and why they did what they did. I wonft go in — and 
the first one, Lisa Ovard, I!m not going to talk — she talked 
about the face wrapped in the T-shirt. The hand in the right 
jacket pocket. Said, Put the money in the bag. You have a 
hand here, his hand is in his pocket, something is pointed 
toward you protruding and you are told to put the money in the 
bag. What did she think? That' s the representation of a 
dangerous weapon. What did she think as far as death or 
danger? 
THE COURT: She thought there was a strong 
possibility that it was a gun and acted accordingly. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: And she said the exact word was fear 
for her life. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh, I recall. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: And that's Count I. 
Count II, again given the plastic bag, it's described 
9 
as a Ziplock bag without a Ziplock. He said, Fill it. It's 
the sa:;ie hand all the way through, right hand in the pocket. 
He looked like he had — 
THE COURT: Is this the woman who said have a good 
day? 
MR. UPDEGROVE: It was pretty eyes and the whole — I 
know that we got bizarre reading. It looked like he had a gun 
in his right hand, again feared for her life. The 
representation looked like it might be a gun in his hand, she 
wasn't sure. And she feared for her life. That's Count II. 
Jennifer Forsgren in Count III, Put money in the 
bag — 
THE COURT: It was the same state of mind with each 
of them. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Right hand. Assumed he had a gun. 
Allen Cantonwine, told to put money in the bag, right 
hand in the pocket of a sweatshirt and he didn't say 
anything — 
THE COURT: But none of these people, and it's not a 
point of dispute I don't think at all, none of these people 
contend that the defendant, this individual, ever said anything 
like I've got a gun and I'll shoot you or I'll blow you away. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: That's true. 
THE COURT: Or even you'll be sorry if you don't put 
money in the bag. No reference was made to retaliatory conduct 
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even. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: But Mr. Cantonwine said if it was a 
gun, I didn!t want him to shoot me. 
Paragraph nvunber five, Ms. Valdez — now five and six 
are on the same day. 
THE COURT: Yes, I'm aware of that. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: And he had changed his MO slightly. 
He was wearing a hooded sweatshirt with a black cap in both of 
the cases, but he didn't have the scarf wrapped around his 
face. Ms. Valdez said, Give me the money. And referred to him 
as a baby-faced, good looking kid. She testified she was a 
little frightened and the defendant was either pretending like 
he had a gun or he did have one. And of course Ms. Cho in 
Count VI, the hooded sweatshirt, pointed his finger toward me. 
Asked for money. And Mr. Anderson's cross-examination it is 
asked if it scared her. If he didn't threaten me I would not 
have given him $20. However, his hand was in his pocket and 
something was in there and I was scared. 
Now, my reading of the statute, my reading of the law 
is that he was using a representation and his object was to 
frighten the people into giving him money. Frighten the people 
to the point where he might have a gun, they thought he had a 
gun, he possibly had a gun. 
THE COURT: Okay. We can agree that his object was 
to frighten the people, or at least one could consider that 
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that's the case if they heard the testimony. But is that 
sufficient under the law? 
MR. UPDEGROVE: I say it's sufficient under the law 
for when you read it carefully and it says the representation 
and when you get down to the phrases, the phrases here on — in 
76-1-601.5 concerning dangerous weapon, the actor's use or 
apparent intended use of the item, meaning the representation 
in this case, leads the victim to reasonably believe the item 
is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury. And if that 
were not the case, then anyone could walk in, act like they had 
a weapon, get money, walk out, and if they're caught, just like 
Mr. Johnson is doing, saying, no, no, no, no, I didn't have a 
weapon. The worst you can do to me, the very worst you can do 
to me is simple robbery. I didn't have a weapon, I wanted them 
to think I had a weapon. 
THE COURT: Right. What about the Candelario case? 
Let's talk about that. Doesn't the Candelario case require 
both a representation and a verbal representation? 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Let me see the date of that case, 
your Honor. 
THE COURT: Candelario is '95, and it's a Court of 
Appeals case. Candelario is referenced in Mr. Anderson's — 
MR. UPDEGROVE: I think it's referenced in mine too. 
Yes, page 2. 
THE COURT: And there's also State versus Harkman. 
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MR. UPDEGROVE: Facsimile refers to the physical 
likeness of a weapon. Representation refers to a picture, 
model, statement or other reproduction. Refers to a likeness, 
statement or other reproduction. 
THE COURT: Is a finger a — they're not even clear 
it's a finger — a reproduction? It could be a Tootsy Roll 
somebody said. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: It could be a Tootsy Roll. But the 
object of what Mr. Johnson was doing was — his object is to 
want them to give him money through force — through fear of 
using deadly force. 
THE COURT: Right. So youfve got a clear robbery, if 
the facts are to be believed. If the witnesses have testified 
credibly, the jury could well conclude that you've got 
robberies. 
My question is do you have ag robberies, and 
obviously that's the point of the motion. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: And I believe we do through the — 
when you use the word — now Candelario — 
THE COURT: Blast you, or I'll blast you, so there's 
a verbal representation as well as a — 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Which he didn't do. 
THE COURT: Well, he didn't blast anybody, but 
threatening language, a verbal representation, if you will, was 
made in that case. It seems like all the case law where they 
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found aggravated robbery, since changing the law, has required 
some kind of verbal representation. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: I don't believe that's correct as far 
as — 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: As you don't have to say I'm going to 
shoot you and/or I — 
THE COURT: You certainly don't have to say I'm going 
to shoot you. But to say I have a gun or something of that 
nature seems to be required beyond a finger or a possible 
finger in the pocket. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: My understanding isn't the law as 
such that a — there's a verbal threat and there's a nonverbal 
threat. Obviously in this case we have a nonverbal threat. 
THE COURT: I understand. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: He is saying to those people I have a 
gun without saying to them I have a gun. 
THE COURT: And my question is is that sufficient 
under the law? And I understand the State's position is that 
it is. If you want to say anything about Count II on the 
motion to quash. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: I would submit it. I would submit on 
the — you read my — 
THE COURT: Cursory, but it was well written and to 
the point. 
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Mr. Anderson. 
MR. ANDERSON: Your Honor, our position is that it is 
not a sufficient representation just having your hand in your 
pocket. It doesn't distinguish the case sufficiently to make 
it a first degree felony versus a second degree felony. 
THE COURT: Are you relying on Candelario for that? 
MR. ANDERSON: Yes, your Honor. And also even in the 
language of the statute where it says a facsimile or 
representation of the item. An item is described as capable of 
causing death or serious bodily injury. I think it's talking 
something beyond one simple body part, but something like akin 
to a facsimile that is presented in such a way that would give 
the impression, more than just a hand in your pocket. 
I think that — I am relying on Candelario and also 
on Harkman, your Honor, which is again a verbal statement. And 
there hasn't been a case specifically addressing this issue in 
Utah. I mean, this may be the first one. But I think that 
there has not been a sufficient representation to separate it 
from a second degree to a first degree aggravated felony. 
THE COURT: All right. With reference to the motion 
to quash Count II, it's denied. 
MR. ANDERSON: Okay. 
THE COURT: Count II will go to trial. 
MR. ANDERSON: Okay. 
THE COURT: I am going to find that the motion to 
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reduce the aggravated robberies to simple robberies is a motion 
that's well taken and I'm going to grant it. I may be wrong in 
my reading of Candelario and the statute, but I believe that it 
requires more than just a hand in a pocket. And that's all 
we've got. Some of these people don't even know if it was a 
finger pointing out as a gun. 
I think more is required for aggravated robbery and I 
think the case law is clear that more is required for a 
representation, at least that's my finding at this time, and 
therefore we're going to trial on four counts in the case 
ending with the numbers 176, but they're all going to be simple 
robberies versus ag robberies. And on the companion case we're 
going to trial on two counts, and again we're talking about 
simple robberies versus aggravated robberies. There was 
nothing different in terms of what was said or manifested. 
Have we set a trial date? 
MR. ANDERSON: We have not, your Honor. 
THE COURT: For either of these? We need to do that. 
I guess, Mr. Updegrove, it's up to you to decide which of these 
cases you would like to try first. Why don't we go ahead and 
pick a trial date. Obviously the defendant is incarcerated. 
Mr. Anderson, do you have any objection to you and 
the defendant approaching? 
MR. ANDERSON: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Updegrove, you can approach also. 
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Closer. 
MR- UPDEGROVE: Closer? 
THE COURT: All the way. 
Okay, thank you, you may all step back. 
Which case, Mr. Updegrove, would you prefer to try 
first? 
MR. UPDEGROVE: The one ending in 176, your Honor, 
the four counts. 
THE COURT: Okay. And that was my guess. Is the 
defendant being held on anything else at this juncture? 
MR. ANDERSON: He is not, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. So when would you like to try 
it ideally? As soon as possible? 
MR. UPDEGROVE: He's in jail. Ifm booked up. 
MR. ANDERSON: Yes, your Honor. If you have 
something after the second week in June. If that's too soon 
for you — 
MR. UPDEGROVE: I have something on the 17 t h of 
June. 
THE COURT: You do have something or you're clear on 
the 17th? 
MR. UPDEGROVE: No, your Honor, I have something on 
the 17 t h of June. 
THE COURT: Let's see if we can do that. Hefs in 
custody and at this point hasn't waived his right to a speedy 
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trial to go beyond June, so we need to find a date, I would 
say, before the 19 of June, unless there's some kind of 
agreement to a later date. 
MR. ANDERSON: The week of the 14 t h would be great. 
THE CLERK: We could do June 14th. 
THE COURT: How about June 14th? 
MR. ANDERSON: That would be fine with me. 
THE COURT: Mr. Updegrove? 
MR. UPDEGROVE: I wish I had brought my — 
THE CLERK: Can you call? 
THE COURT: Do you want to use the phone and call 
your secretary? 
MR. UPDEGROVE: I think I probably should. 
THE COURT: Why don't you do that. We'll go off the 
record for a moment. 
(Off-the-record discussion.) 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Your Honor — 
THE COURT: Yes, on the record. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: I need of course the findings of fact 
you have made through the — 
THE COURT: I!m going to have Mr. Anderson prepare 
findings of fact with specificity talking about the fact that 
what I started out by saying, that everyone has agreed that 
there was no verbal representation to a crime of violence. Not 
Ifm going to blow you away or you're going to regret this or 
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I'm going to kill you. No representation to a gun or to a 
weapon at all, that there was merely essentially a bulge in the 
pocket. And some witnesses said that the bulge was protruding. 
That's as good as it gets, is my understanding. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: And if I might, your Honor, in the 
direction or exactly toward a couple of the — 
THE COURT: Well, there's an inconsistency on that. 
I think some of the witnesses said that it seemed to be pointed 
or directed toward them, others just said that the hand was in 
the pocket and the hand in the pocket was on the counter not 
pointing toward them. I think you have both. 
And so if you would address with specificity what 
each witness said with reference to each count, that would be 
helpful. 
And also that some witnesses spoke of the fact that 
they thought it was either a gun or a finger or a Tootsy Roll 
or candy of some kind, depending upon which witness we're 
talking of. 
MR. ANDERSON: All right, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Incidentally, and I'm making a ruling 
today and on — I may be wrong, but this is the ruling that I 
believe is equitable and fair under the law, but I am not for 
one minute making any kind of statement that a person facing 
someone with a hand in their pocket that's pointed in their 
direction may not feel as great of fear as someone who 
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questions what the object is, but has a concern, so let's be 
perfectly clear that I'm not condoning this conduct in any way. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: And Pat would right conclusions of 
law in the record? 
MR. ANDERSON: Certainly. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: How soon could you get that? 
MR. ANDERSON: Hopefully by Monday. 
THE COURT: Why don t we give you a week. Why don't 
we give you until the 26 . 
MR. ANDERSON: Okay. 
THE COURT: That gives you a little bit longer. 
Now, let's see, we talked about the 17 of June, I 
think. 
THE CLERK: June 14th. 
THE COURT: Excuse me, June 14 t h, I wasn't looking 
at the calendar. Do you want to call, Mr. Updegrove? 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Certainly. 
tli THE COURT: What about June 1
 r so we have two 
dates. 
THE CLERK: That would work as well. 
THE COURT: So what about June 7 t h, Mr. Anderson? 
MR. ANDERSON: That would be fine. 
THE COURT: So you have those two dates that you can 
choose from. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: I'm going to be visiting my father in 
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San Antonio up until the 1st. 
THE COURT: Why don't you get on the phone and see. 
(Off-the-record discussion.) 
THE COURT: Incidentally, Mr. Anderson, I!m not 
saying that there may not be circumstances under which the 
representation, nonverbal representation, is sufficient, but 
under these particular circumstances I do not find it to be 
sufficient for aggravated robbery. I'm not saying that a hand 
in a pocket accompanied by certain gestures or whatever might 
not be sufficient under some circumstances, but this is just 
not the case. 
MR. ANDERSON: Okay. 
THE COURT: And reference the case law that applies. 
MR. ANDERSON: I certainly will. 
(Off-the-record discussion.) 
MR. UPDEGROVE: The 14th is a bad day. The 7 t h — 
THE COURT: Youf re going to have to make one of them 
work. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: We're trying to set a jury trial. 
THE COURT: For someone in custody. The only other 
st possibility is what about the 21 , Michelle? 
THE CLERK: That works for our calendar. 
THE COURT: You can do 7 t h, 14th, or 21 s t. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Okay, the 21 s t. 
MR. ANDERSON: The 21 s t is fine, your Honor. 
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THE COURT: All right, we're back on the record. 
Mr. Anderson, you just said okay that will work when we spoke 
st 
of the 21 of June as the trial date. Now, for the record, 
that is about two or three days beyond the 30 days. Does your 
client waive his right to a speedy trial with that date in 
mind? 
THE DEFENDANT: No problem. 
MR. ANDERSON: He said yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: And I believe he said no problem. 
THE DEPENDANT: No problem. 
MR. ANDERSON: He said no problem. 
THE COURT: So noted. And he waives his right to a 
speedy trial on the companion case as well, which we!re not 
setting at the present time, is that correct? 
MR. ANDERSON: She'll set it as soon as she possibly 
can after this case is resolved. 
THE COURT: And one thing that happens sometimes, 
Mr. Johnson, is that when one case is tried it results in a 
resolution of the other case. Some kind of plea is offered, 
there may be some plea bargain offered after today in any 
event. But we can't try both cases on the same day and we 
can't try both of them in 30 days unless you absolutely insist 
on it, and that puts your lawyer, in my opinion, at a real 
disadvantage. So do you waive your right to a speedy trial? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
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THE COURT: In other words, I have given you a date 
that's about 30 days from now. 
THE DEFENDANT: Okay. 
THE COURT: If the other case needs to be tried, 
we'll set it within 30 days of the other case. 
THE DEFENDANT: Okay. 
THE COURT: Okay? Do you waive your right with that 
in mind? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Updegrove. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: I'm sorry, your Honor, 8:30 on the 
THE COURT: 8:30 on the 21 s t. You missed my joke, 
MR. UPDEGROVE: 0830, your Honor. 
THE COURT: 0830, okay. And we're going to pre-try 
this on the 11 t h at 0830. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Now — 
MR. ANDERSON: I'm writing 0830 on my paper here. 
THE COURT: Yeah, like we would think it was 8:30, 
the other 8:30 would be 1630, wouldn't it? 
MR. UPDEGROVE: What's this? 
THE COURT: No, it would be — 8:30 p.m. would be? 
MR. UPDEGROVE: 2030. 
THE COURT: 2030, okay. I still haven't quite got 
21st? 
0830. 
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it. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: The 404 (b) requires that I give 
notice of 404 (b). 
THE COURT: And I'm going to find for the record that 
you have given notice of 404 (b) evidence that I believe there 
is a sufficiency here of what I would call MO factors or common 
factors that the 404 of the evidence at this point looks like 
it's viable. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: One to the other. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Both cases. 
THE COURT: Well, I can't say that the case with four 
counts can be used in the other case, but the four counts can 
certainly be used — 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Oh, certainly, the four counts. 
THE COURT: Do you know what I'm saying? I'm 
articulating it very poorly. You don't have an I.D. on all 
four of your counts in the case that's going to trial first, 
but you can certainly use the other counts to — or you do have 
an I.D. to bolster in terms of the other case, I don't know 
that reference to that is going to be allowed. There are not 
common elements that I recall. But as to the two counts in the 
remaining case, there does seem to be some commonality. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: And I guess, your Honor, could 
determine from my questions about the finding factors and the 
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order, I'm obviously going to call the AG and see what they 
think and if they think it's worth — and obviously we have 
a — we would be at all stop until they did their thing. 
THE COURT: You mean filing an appeal? 
MR. UPDEGROVE: That's harsh. 
THE COURT: Well, it doesn't bother me if you want to 
file an appeal. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: But I have to have them tell me 
whether they think that it's an appealable issue. 
THE COURT: Obviously you have the right to check 
with them and do whatever you deem to be appropriate. But I'm 
going to press forward because this defendant is incarcerated 
and has the right to a speedy trial. And frankly, on this one 
I think I'm right. Okay. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Yes, ma'am. 
MR. ANDERSON: Okay. 
THE COURT: And you were on the phone, I don't know 
if you heard me say that I'm not making a finding that in every 
case where what we have is a hand in a pocket that that 
automatically means that it's insufficient. But on these 
facts, I find that it's insufficient in this context, for what 
it's worth. 
Okay, I think that takes care of everything. 
MR. ANDERSON: Thank you, your Honor. 
THE DEFENDANT: Thank you, your Honor. 
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1 I THE COURT: We're in recess. 
2 J (Proceedings concluded at 2:36 p.m.) 
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